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The proposition that recessions slow inflation is now well estab-
ne lished. In the United States as well as in other industrial countries
there has been a virtual one-to-one correspondence between the
ec
- occurrenceof recessions or economic slowdowns and substantial
h reductions in the rate of price inflation. It is equally true that periods er between recessions, when economic growth is more rapid, are the
bi times when inflation accelerates.' A complex network of interrela-
" tions among economic variables operates to produce this result.
Although short-run "cyclical" movements in the inflation rate are
of great concern, probably even greater significance attaches to the
long-run trends in inflation. From 1960 to 1980 the rate of increase
in the U. S. consumer price index climbed to successively higher
cyclical peaks. The declines that occurred during and immediately
after recessions failed to bring the rate down to as low a level as it
had reached after the preceding recession. The inflation rate ratch-
eted upward. Recessions have slowed inflation but have not, during
the past twenty years, cured it.
One of the possible reasons for the underlying trend—the chang-
ing nature of the business cycle itself—has not received much atten-
tion in recent years. In the 1920s, Wesley C. Mitchell arid Willard
Thorp (1926) suggested a simple hypothesis about long swings in the
level of wholesale prices, namely, that they were associated with the
relative length of business cycle expansions and contractions. A pe-
nod during which expansions were much longer than contractions
would generate more inflation than a period when expansions were




beena regular alternation of such periods, each one lasting twenty or
thirty years, corresponding with the upswings and downswings in the
wholesale price index (WPI).
Some twenty years later Mitchell and Arthur F. Burns (1946)
examined the same hypothesis with a different set of measurements,
extended the record to the 1930s, and found a similar result. We can
now add another chapter. Continuing the same chronology of long
swings in wholesale prices, the entire period from 1932 through 1981 >.
mustbe classified as an upswing. In only a few years have prices
been lower than the year before.2 Encompassing five decades, it is
by far the longest period of rising prices in the entire record back to
1790. It is also the largest upswing: In 1981 the WPI was more than
eight times its level in 1932. We find that the Mitchell—Thorp-.Burns
hypothesis is supported once again. The expansion phases of business
cycles outlasted the contraction phases throughout the period 1932-
1981, and by a margin that had not even been approached in earlier
times. There were five years of expansion for every year of recession.
Figure 15—1 shows the long-standing association between the rate of
price inflation and the relative length of the prosperous phases of
business cycles.
In these exhibits we use the wholesale price index to identify and
date the long swings, as Mitchell, Thorp, and Burns did originally. In
addition, we measure the changes in the consumer price index during
the same intervals, even though it is based on very slender evidence
j
inthe early years (see note to Table 15—1). The dates of the long
swings would be somewhat different if based on the consumer price
index itself, but taking the whole period, the wholesale price index
provides firmer evidence.
What the results seem to mean is that the success the nation has . w
hadin moderating the business cycle since the 1930s—specifically,
shortening recessions and lengthening expansions—has been achieved
only at a price, namely an ever-rising price level. The current as well
as the previous manifestations of this relationship, a kind of long-run
Phillips curve, were doubtless brought about by monetary, fiscal,
labor market, and other factors that produced both the shifts in'
cycle-phasedurations and the accompanying shifts in inflation. Epi-
sodic factors were at work also, such as wars, gold discoveries, oil'
priceexplosions, and new legislation or administrative procedures. .
Herewe shall not review this long history but will instead concen-
trate upon some aspects of the most recent upswing, especially the
period since 1948.
One aspect that is especially intriguing is the possible emergence of










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Cyclical Fluctuations and Secular Inflation 241
fromJuly 1980 to July 1981 was not only one of the shortest on
record (twelve months) but was also short relative to the recession
that preceded it, which lasted only six months. This two-to-one
ratio had not occurred in any of the eight business cycles since the
Great Depression of the 1930s. Before then, ratios of two to one or
less were frequent, as Table 15-1 shows. Another way of looking at
the same information is to say that the recession of 1980 was fol-
lowed unusually quickly by the recession of 1981-1982. It would
not be unreasonable to expect, in light of the long historical record,
that the consequence of two recessions back to back will be a more
substantial reduction in the inflation rate than would have been pro-
duced by the usual sequence of brief recessions and long expansions.
Indeed, it is already clear that the decline in the inflation rate since
1980 has been unusually large. Whether this marks a new trend or is
just an episode depends largely on the persistence with which policies
that will promote real growth without inflation are pursued in the
future. Nonetheless, it is an auspicious beginning.
A second aspect of the most recent upswing that deserves atten-
tion is the evidence that the tendency for long busines cycle expan.
4 sions and brief recessions to promote inflation can be materially
modified by appropriate monetary and fiscal policies. Table 15-2
divides the period since 1948 into business cycle segments running
from the peak of one business cycle to the peak of the next. In every
cycle the contraction phase was relatively brief, the subsequent ex-
pansion phase much longer. In every cycle the consumer price index
rose, as did the gross national product implicit price deflator. This is
what our 200-year history has taught us to expect: Long expansions
and short recessions make for a rising trend in prices. . Nevertheless,the rateatwhich the price indexes advanced during
each cycle had little or nothing to do with the relative length of ex-
. pansion versus contraction. In the two cycles between 1953 and
1960 the rate of inflation was very moderate, just over 1 percent per
year, even though the recessions were just as short relative to the ex-
pansions as in the 1973-1980 cycle, when the rate of inflation aver-
aged 9 percent per year. What happened was that the growth in the
stock of money and in the supply of credit accelerated sharply in the
intervening twenty years. This had no apparent effect on the rate of
growth of real output, which was virtually the same in 1973-1980
as in 1953-1960. It did not reduce unemployment, which was some-
what higher in the later period. The money and credit went into in-
.9 flation and into higher interest rates. j Table15-2 contains an important lesson for fiscal policy as well































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Cyclical Fluctuations and Secular Inflation243
werevery closely associated with the growth in total debt of non-
financial borrowers—business enterprises, consumers, state and local
governments, and the federal government. Indeed, the relation be-
tween inflation and the growth of debt is about as close as that
between inflation and the growth of money. It should be noted,
however, that the table does not allow for lags. With time units as
long as a business cycle, however, lags of a year or so might not make
much difference. In any case debt and inflation are closely associ-
ated, a result that bolsters the argument of those who contend that
credit is an appropriate target for monetary policy.
The interesting observation for fiscal policy is that it is the behav-
ior of federal debt that is largely responsible for the close relation
between credit and inflation. Privately held debt grew almost as rap-
idly in the earlier cycles as in the later ones. What varied widely in its
growth rate was federal debt, starting with modest growth in the
1948-1953 cycle, which encompassed the Korean War, going down
to no growth in the next cycle, 1953-1957, and accelerating ever
since. After 1957 the acceleration in federal debt largely produced
the acceleration in total debt and hence produced the close associa-
tion of total debt with the rate of inflation.3 Federal debt did not
crowd out private debt. It was an add-on of increasing size, produc-
ing the wherewithal to finance a rising rate of inflation. Since the
growth of federal debt is primarily determined by the size of the
deficit, the current concern about the long-run trend in the deficit is
clearly justified by the record.
Table 15-2 gives a bit of support to the possibility of a turning
point in the trend of inflation, referred to previously. The most re-
cent cycle, January 1980-July 1981, was not only unusual with
4 - respectto the brevity of the expansion phase (twelve months), but
also because for the first time in nearly three decades the rates of
growth in money and credit were smaller than in the preceding cycle.
If these rates work down below their average levels for the 1948—
1981 period as a whole, to say 3 percent for Ml, 5 percent for M2,
and 7 percent for total debt, the simple regressions between these
rates and the inflation rates, based on the seven cycle observations,
suggest an inflation rate in the 3 percent range. Judging from the
I record in the early years of the period, this is an attainable goal. It
can be attained with output growth in the 3 to 4 percent range,




NOTES TO CHAPTER 15
1.For a brief review of the U.S. evidence see Geoffrey H. Moore, "Will the
slowdown reduce the inflation rate?" Across the Board, The Conference Board
Magazine, 26, no. 9 (September 1979): 3—7. The international evidence is sum-
marized in Chapters 6 and 14 of this volume.
2. In terms of annual averages, the declines in the wholesale price index
(from the preceding year) came in 1938, 1939, 1949, 1952, 1953, 1961, and
1963. The consumer price index registered declines in 1933, 1938, 1939, 1949,
and 1955.
3.It is true that even if federal debt had continued to grow as slowly as it
did, say, in 1957-1960 (2.2 percent per year) the growth of total debt might
still have accelerated, because the effect of the slower growing federal compo-
nent would have diminished as it got to be a smaller part of the total. But in
fact the annual rate of borrowing by the federal government grew more than
sixteenfold between 1957-1960 and 1980-1981, while borrowing by the pri-
vate sector (including state and local governments) merely quadrupled. Hence
the acceleration in growth of total debt was largely attributable to the increasing
fraction of total borrowing done by the federal government. I am indebted to
Arthur Broida for bringing to my attention the interesting point that a slow- Thi
growing component of a total can cause the total to accelerate even if none of cos
the components does so. co
ana
REFERENCES pri
Thorp, Willard. Business Annals. New York: NBER, 1926. cen
Burns, Arthur F., and Wesley C. Mitchell. Measuring Business Cycles. New and
York: NBER, 1946. cha
Mitchell, Wesley C. Business Cycles: The Problem and Its Setting. New York: ano NBER, 1927. of
dis
tha
yea
to
Th€
finc
1
cur
con
and
This
on
Was
'1
stat